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Since 1945 U.S. courts and enforcement agencies have taken the po-
sition that the U.S. antitrust laws apply to transactions that affect U.S.
commerce regardless of their location or the nationality of those partic-
ipating in them. Many foreign and U.S. lawyers and businessmen find this
position surprising-if not offensive. This article is intended to be an
introduction to the rapidly developing, controversial body of U.S. federal
antitrust statutes and case law often labeled "international antitrust."
The U.S. antitrust laws are premised on the theory that competition
will produce the best allocation of economic resources, will promote tech-
nological innovation, and will result in the lowest possible prices for the
widest variety of high quality goods and services. The focus of the antitrust
laws is on conduct that is likely to restrict free and fair competition un-
reasonably. Only unreasonable restraints of competition are illegal under
the antitrust laws. However, on the basis of past experience, some re-
straints have come to be classified as per se unreasonable. Once such a
restraint is proven to exist, no further inquiry will be made into the
reasonableness or economic justification of that restraint. The practices
classified as per se unreasonable include: price fixing, division of markets
among competitors, group boycotts, and certain types of tying arrange-
ments. The vast majority of conduct is measured by what is known as
the "rule of reason," i.e., once the plaintiff has met its initial burden of
proving that the challenged conduct restrains competition, the question
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is whether the restraint is reasonable in the circumstances. The Supreme
Court has held that the basic inquiry under the rule of reason is limited
to whether the restraint in question is one that "promotes competition or
• * * [one that] suppress[es] . .. competition."' It stressed that such an
inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions
and that the function of the court is "to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint. ' 2
The principal objectives of the application of the U.S. antitrust laws to
transnational business transactions are: protection of U.S. domestic con-
sumer welfare and competition and protection of U.S. export and foreign
investment opportunities.
A relevant objective of U.S. foreign policy is the minimization of con-
flicts with foreign nations.
A number of factors make the application of the U.S. antitrust laws to
transnational business transactions a complex and controversial topic. On
the national level, antitrust policy must be reconciled with a number of
other important policies relating to trade, economics, and foreign rela-
tions. The U.S. Government wants to promote exports from the United
States and to prevent the victimization of American consumers and com-
panies by foreign sellers and competitors while it simultaneously stimu-
lates innovation and competition by encouraging foreign participation in
domestic markets.
Many foreign governments have rejected the U.S. assertion of "extra-
territorial" jurisdiction as unauthorized by international law. As Ameri-
ca's economic power has declined, its allies have become increasingly
critical of the application of U.S. concepts of market organization and
competition to activities outside the United States. More than fifteen
"blocking" statutes designed to impede or thwart the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the U.S. antitrust laws have been enacted by some of Amer-
ica's closest allies, including Australia, Canada, England, France, Swit-
1. National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
2. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986); National Soc'y of
Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). See generally ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter ANTITRUST
DEVELOPMENTS]; P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1982); J. VON KALINOWSKI,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION (1968); E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAW (1984); T. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASICS (1985); ANTITRUST ADVISER (C. Hills ed.
1985).
For comprehensive discussions of international antitrust, see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS REVIS-
ITED, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 839 (1985); J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMER-
ICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (2d ed. 1981); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS (3d ed. 1982); B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (2d ed. 1986); A. NEAL & D. GOYDER,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (3d ed. 1980).
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zerland, and West Germany. 3 To complicate matters further, the European
Community and several countries have begun actively to enforce their
own competition laws, which, in some circumstances, may impose pen-
alties on conduct by U.S. companies that is permitted by U.S. law.4
Since the late 1940s a number of multilateral and bilateral efforts have
been initiated to avoid conflicts over inconsistent approaches to compe-
tition policy and over the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws
by negotiated arrangements. Although with the exception of the compe-
tition rules of the European Community the more ambitious of these
projects designed to achieve a binding international code of conduct have
failed, 5 those aimed at notification, consultation, cooperation, and comity
have reduced international tensions. 6 In the foreseeable future the most
3. For details of these developments, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 437 notes 1, 4 (tent. draft no. 7, 1986) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (REVISED)]; A. HERMANN, CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL LAWS WITH INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY: ISSUES OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY (1982); A. LOWE, Ex-
TRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS (1983);
PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER
LAWS (J. Griffin ed. 1979); D. ROSENTHAL &. W. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY (1982); Griffin, Pos-
sible Resolutions of International Disputes Over Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18
STAN. J. INT'L L. 279 (1982); Havers, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: A Discussion
of Problems Concerning the Exercise of Jurisdiction, 17 INT'L LAW. 784 (1983); Joelson,
International Antitrust: Problems and Defenses, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1121 (1983);
Symposium, Jurisdictional Conflicts Arising From Extraterritorial Enforcement, 54 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 711 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Wood Pulp, 28 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 85), 1, 3 (1984) (European Com-
mission held that Webb-Pomerene Association and others had engaged in price fixing in the
European wood pulp market); van der Esch, Some Aspects of "'Extraterritorial" Infringe-
ment of EEC Competition Rules, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 285 (1986); Stockmann,
Foreign Application of European Antitrust Laws, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 251
(1986); Note, Commission of the European Communities Suspends Proceedings Against
IBM, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 189 (1985).
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publishes useful
reports on national developments in Competition Policy in OECD Countries.
5. See, e.g., Symposium, Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, 30 AM. U.L.
REV. 903 (1981); Miller & Davidow, Antitrust at the United Nations: A Tale of Two Codes,
18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347 (1982); Joint Letter on Voluntary International Guidelines on
Antitrust, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 34 (1982); Joelson & Griffin, International Regulation of
Restrictive Business Practices Engaged in by Transnational Enterprises: A Prognosis, 1I
INT'L LAW. 5 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Cooperation Between
Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD
Doc. C(79) 154 (Sept. 25, 1979); Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Con-
sultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws,
United States-Canada, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,464 (Mar. 9, 1984), reprinted in 23
I.L.M. 275 (1984). See generally Comment, The Canada-United States Memorandum of
Understanding Regarding Application of National Antitrust Law: New Guidelines for Res-
olution of Multinational Antitrust Enforcement Disputes, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1065
(1985); Antitrust Cooperation Agreement, United States-Australia, [Current Comment 1969-
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likely scenario appears to be one involving ad hoc political resolution of
serious conflicts and increasing reliance on international comity to min-
imize friction in routine cases.
Although this review is limited to an analysis of the U.S. federal antitrust
laws, it is important to remember that the antitrust laws of foreign coun-
tries, as well as the state antitrust laws, may apply to a single transaction.
For example, New York and California companies might agree to form a
joint venture to manufacture widgets in the United States and to sell those
widgets at a fixed price in the United States and in Europe via distributors
in England and West Germany. A determination of the antitrust propriety
of such a transaction could involve an analysis of the U.S., New York,
California, U.K., German, and European Community antitrust laws.
I. Relevant U.S. Statutes
A. THE SHERMAN ACT
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits joint conduct that unreasonably
restrains "trade or commerce ... with foreign nations. ' 7 The legislative
history of this provision indicates that Congress intended to enact the
statute pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate interstate and for-
eign commerce. 8 The Supreme Court has held that in enacting the Sher-
man Act, "Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional
power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements." 9 In 1982 Congress
clarified and limited the application of the Sherman Act to export com-
merce and to wholly foreign transactions by amending the Act to require
that the challenged conduct have a "direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on U.S. domestic or import commerce, or on the U.S.
export trade of a person engaged in such trade in the United States. The
Act's applicability to U.S. import commerce was left unchanged. 10
1983] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,440 (June 29, 1982). See generally Note, The United
States-Australian Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: A Step in the Right Direction, 24 VA.
J. INT'L L. 127 (1983); Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive
Business Practices, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
50,283 (June 23, 1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
8. See I E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
AND RELATED STATUTES ch. 1 (1978); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY
(1954).
9. United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Papst
Motoren GmbH & Co. v. Kanematsu-Gosho (U.S.A.), Inc., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,924 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Liamuiga Tours v. Travel Impressions, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 920
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,672 (N.D.
Cal. 1984). For background, see Garvey, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1981, 14 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1 (1982).
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Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which has the same jurisdictional reach
as section 1, prohibits attempts and conspiracies to monopolize and
monopolization. I 
B. SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the direct or indirect acquisition
by one person of all or any part of the stock or assets of another person
"where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." Both the
acquiring and acquired entities must be persons that are "engaged in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce." Moreover, the potential
anticompetitive effects of the acquisition must be "in any section of the
[United States]." Thus, if the only anticompetitive effects of a merger are
outside of the United States, section 7 does not apply. 12
C. SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) prohibits
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting U.S. commerce. 13 In 1982 Congress amended section 5 of
the FTC Act to include the same "direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable effect" test of jurisdiction over export conduct that applies
to the Sherman Act. 14 Section 5 is intended as a catch-all statute to cover
conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts as well as other
unfair conduct. 15
11. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); see Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers,
Inc., 526 F.2d 1196(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959(1976); Baker, Market Definition
in Transnational Joint Ventures, Mergers and Monopolization, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 115 (B. Hawk ed. 1985).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982); see 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984); Sym-
posium, The 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 613 (1984);
Halverson, Transnational Joint Ventures and Mergers Under U.S. Antitrust Law, in 1984
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 143 (B. Hawk ed. 1985); Griffin, Federal Antitrust Restrictions
on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, in MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (J. Marans ed. 1984).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
14. Id. § 45(a)(3).
15. See generally Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944); 6 J. VON KALINOWSKI,
supra note 2, § 39.
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D. OTHER ANTITRUST STATUTES
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman amendments to the Clayton Act,16
which deals with price discrimination, and section 3 of the Clayton Act,17
which deals with exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, only apply to
transactions in which the commodities or goods involved are sold "for
use, consumption or resale in the United States."' 18
11. Enforcement
A. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT
At the federal level antitrust enforcement responsibilities are vested
primarily in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Except for express statutory exemp-
tions or immunities, the Antitrust Division and the FTC have authority
to investigate and take enforcement action against anticompetitive activ-
ities in all sectors of the economy. With the exception of criminal actions
under the Sherman Act, which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Antitrust Division, and enforcement of the FTC Act by the FTC, the two
agencies have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the antitrust laws. How-
ever, the Antitrust Division has chosen not to enforce the Robinson-
Patman antiprice discrimination law. In order to avoid duplication of ef-
fort, the two agencies have a formal liaison arrangement that requires
each agency to obtain the clearance of the other before a formal inves-
tigation is opened. Decisions as to which agency will conduct particular
investigations depend on the nature of the suspected violation, the com-
pany involved, the type of industry or product involved and the expertise
or experience of the agency with a particular industry or product.
The Antitrust Division and the FTC have significant organizational dif-
ferences. The Antitrust Division is the responsibility of the Assistant
Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, who, as a practical matter,
has the final say in m6st important actions involving the Division. The
Justice Department conducts internal investigations but may move im-
mediately into the federal district court for proceedings pursuant to either
the Federal Rules of Civil, or Criminal, Procedure. On the other hand,
16. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F.
Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
18. Sections 2(c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Robinson-Patman Act contain no requirement
that the goods involved be used or resold in the United States. Section 2(c) has been held
to apply to the sale of goods or commodities for export. See id. §§ 13(c), (d), (e), (f); Paceco,
Inc. v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Indus. Co., 468 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Baysoy
v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
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the FTC is an independent, administrative agency in which the major
enforcement decisions are taken by a majority vote among the five com-
missioners. After making a decision to bring an enforcement action, the
FTC staff files an administrative complaint and the parties go through an
administrative hearing before an administrative law judge. The decision
of the law judge may be appealed to the full Commission and from there
to the appropriate federal circuit court of appeals. Both agencies have
procedures under which companies may obtain guidance concerning pro-
posed conduct, 19 and frequently issue "guides" and speeches describing
enforcement policy.20
B. STATE ENFORCEMENT
In addition to enforcing state antitrust laws, state officials have authority
to file parens patriae suits in federal court on behalf of natural persons
who as a class suffer injury caused by a violation of the federal antitrust
laws.21
C. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
More than ninety percent of antitrust litigation is initiated by private
parties. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 22 In the 1978 Pfizer decision the Supreme Court held that
the "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages under section 4 include
foreign governments.2 3 In 1982 Congress limited the Pfizer decision by
amending the Clayton Act to provide that in situations where a foreign
government was acting in a governmental rather than commercial capac-
ity, that government may recover only actual damages plus costs, in-
19. The Justice Department has a Business Review Procedure. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6. The
FTC issues Advisory Opinions. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1986).
20. See, e.g., ANTITRUST DIVISION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTER-
NATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL GUIDE]; Rule, "Antitrust Guide
for International Operations: A Progress Report" (Oct. 16, 1986); Calvani, The Effects of
Internationalization on FTC Antitrust Analysis, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,477 (Nov.
14, 1985).
21. 156 U.S.C. § 15c (1982).
22. Id. § 15(a). Private parties may also seek injunctive relief. Id. § 26. The Supreme
Court held that a person seeking injunctive relief must show "a threat of antitrust injury,
and that a showing of loss or damage due merely to increased competition does not constitute
such injury." Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484, 495 (1986).
23. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
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cluding reasonable attorney's fees. 24 The basic objective of this amend-
ment was to limit foreign governments to the same damage recovery rights
to which the U.S. Government is entitled as a civil plaintiff.25
III. Statutory Exemptions
In some instances Congress has resolved the conflicts between eco-
nomic or social policies and free and fair competition by creating statutory
exemptions from the antitrust laws.
A. APPROVED EXPORT CARTELS
The Webb-Pomerene Act, 26 enacted in 1918, provides a limited ex-
emption from the Sherman Act for trade associations formed solely for
the purpose of engaging in export trade. Associations must register with
the FTC and file periodic reports. Association activities outside the scope
of the immunity may be challenged at any time by antitrust enforcement
agencies or private parties. 27 Because of the restrictions imposed on Webb
associations they have never been very popular and have accounted for
only one to three percent of U.S. exports. 28
B. EXPORT TRADING COMPANIES
The Export Trading Act of 198229 was enacted to expand the availability
of the export trading exemption. Pursuant to this statute, any U.S. person
engaged in export trade may request a "certificate of review" from the
Secretary of Commerce for conduct specified in an application. The Sec-
retary must publish notice of the application in the Federal Register and
must obtain the concurrence of the Attorney General before the certificate
of review can be issued. All grants, denials, amendments, revocations,
and modifications of certificates of review are subject to judicial review. 30
24. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982).
25. Id. § 15a. Although the 1982 amendments to the Sherman and FTC Acts do limit the
rights of foreign plaintiffs, the legislative history of those amendments indicates that Con-
gress did not intend to overrule the Pfizer decision in the situation where the challenged
conduct affects domestic and foreign markets. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1982).
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982); see McDermid, The Antitrust Commission and the Webb-
Pomerene Act: A Critical Assessment, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 105 (1980).
27. See United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199 (1968).
28. FTC, Webb-Pomerene Associations: Ten Years Later 15 (Staff Analysis, Nov. 1978).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 4011-4021 (1982). For Regulations, see 15 C.F.R. pt. 325; see also
Guidelines for the Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of Review (Second Edition), 50
Fed. Reg. 1,786 (1985).
30. See, e.g., Horizons Int'l, Inc. v. Baldridge, 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,422 (3d
Cir. 1987).
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If the certificate is granted, the certificate holder is protected against
criminal and treble damage liability for conduct specified in the certificate
that occurred while the certificate was in effect. Private parties may chal-
lenge certified conduct and obtain injunctive relief, single damages, and
costs if they are able to prove conduct in violation of standards set out
in the statute that governs the award of a certificate. If the court deter-
mines that the challenged conduct did not violate the Act and was covered
by the certificate, the plaintiff must pay the defendant's legal expenses.
This statute also deters private challenges to certified conduct by creating
a presumption of legality for persons operating under the terms of the
conduct specified in their certificate. The certificate does not provide
immunity against violations of foreign antitrust laws. 31
The Commerce Department believes that exporters can obtain greater
protection for their export conduct under the certificate of review process
than under the Webb-Pomerene Act. 32 The protections against criminal
and treble damage liability afforded by the certificate are not available to
Webb associations. Moreover, a Webb association must be engaged solely
in the export of goods. Certificates of review are available for exports of
services as well as commodities. 33 The Department of Commerce has
actively encouraged Webb associations to seek certificates of review.
Several Webb associations have obtained such certificates. 34
C. INTERNATIONAL AvIATION
The Department of Transportation may exempt persons engaged in
international aviation activities from the operation of the antitrust laws
pursuant to sections 41235 and 41436 of the Federal Aviation Act. If the
Department finds that a contract, agreement, or request "substantially
reduces or eliminates competition," it may not grant an exemption unless
it finds that the contract, agreement, or request "is necessary to meet a
serious transportation need or to secure important public benefits, in-
cluding international comity or foreign policy considerations," and such
31. Garvey, Exports, Banking and Antitrust: The Export Trading Company Act-A Modest
Tool for Export Promotion, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 818 (1983); Unkovic, Joint Ventures
and the Export Trading Company Act, 5 J.L. & CoM. 373 (1985); Zarin, The Export Trading
Company Act: Reducing Antitrust Uncertainty in Export Trade, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 297 (1983).
32. Lewis, Title IIl of the Export Trading Company Act: A Case Study in Interagency
Coordination to Promote Exports, 5 J.L. & CoM. 451 (1985).
33. Guidelines for the Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of Review (Second Edition),
50 Fed. Reg. 1,786, at 1,788 (1985).
34. See, e.g., Export Trade Certificate of Review; Issuance, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,004 (1985).
35. 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1982).
36. Id. § 1384.
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need or benefits cannot be secured by reasonably available alternative
means having materially less anticompetitive effect. 37
The Department of Transportation is also responsible for reviewing
airline mergers and acquisitions, pooling agreements, and interlocking
relationships. 38 One aspect of the complex Laker litigation was an alle-
gation that a number of North Atlantic carriers had engaged in predatory
pricing to drive Laker Airways out of business. 39 The Justice Department
convened a grand jury to study these allegations. President Reagan ter-
minated the grand jury investigation for "foreign policy" reasons in No-
vember 1984.40 Subsequently, the Justice Department issued a business
review letter clearance to British Airways designed to allay its fears that
proposed discount fares might be subject to attack as predatory.4 1
One issue left unresolved by the Laker litigation is whether bilateral
aviation agreements supersede inconsistent provisions of U.S. antitrust
law. At one stage the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit indicated
its skepticism that such agreements could confer immunity under U.S.
antitrust laws.
42
In July 1984 the Justice Department obtained a criminal indictment
under section 1 of the Sherman Act against Air Florida and three foreign
airlines for allegedly fixing prices on passenger routes between the United
States and Central America. Two weeks later the three foreign airlines
pleaded "no contest" and were each fined $250,000. 43
D. INTERNATIONAL OCEAN SHIPPING
The Shipping Act of 198444 significantly altered the regulatory scheme
relating to ocean shipping. The 1984 Act authorizes a broad range of
agreements and practices among ocean common carriers. However, the
Act did inject a number of competition principles into the regulatory
37. Id. § 1382(a)(2)(A).
38. Id. §§ 1378, 1379, 1382.
39. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984); British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413 (H.L.), reprinted
in 23 I.L.M. 727 (1984); Note, The Laker Antitrust Litigation: The Jurisdictional "Rule of
Reason" Applied to Transnational Injunctive Relief, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 645 (1986).
40. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1984, § 4, at 1, col. 4.
41. Dept. of Justice, Press Release (Dec. 20, 1984), reprinted in 48 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1196, at 42 (Jan. 3, 1985).
42. Laker, 731 F.2d at 932; see also Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Goldschmidt,
627 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
43. United States v. Air Florida, Inc., 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) $ 45,084 (Case 3197)
(D.D.C. 1984); United States v. Air Florida, Inc., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,786 (S.D.
Fla. 1985).
44. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1720 (West Supp. 1987).
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scheme while simultaneously expanding the antitrust immunity provisions
and making immunity easier to obtain.
45
E. MISCELLANEOUS EXEMPTIONS
There are a number of narrow exemptions from the application of the
antitrust laws in specialized areas such as international energy allocation
agreements, 4 6 national defense programs, 47 research joint ventures,48 and
international communications. 49
IV. International Arbitration Agreements
In 1985 the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth Inc.50 held that contractual provisions providing for foreign
arbitration of disputes involving international transactions are enforceable
even if the dispute involves alleged violations of U.S. antitrust laws.
Antitrust claims are not arbitrable in domestic transactions. The Court
stated that U.S. courts may review arbitral awards before they enforce
them pursuant to the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards. It suggested, however, that such reviews
should be limited to determining whether the tribunal actually decided
the antitrust claims at issue. 51
V. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A. "TRADE OR COMMERCE ... WITH FOREIGN NATIONS"
Subject matter jurisdiction addresses the question of whether the court
is authorized to rule on the issues raised by the complaint. The first
analytical step in determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists
under the U.S. antitrust laws is to determine whether the challenged
45. Donovan, Godwin & Kessler, The Shipping Act of 1984, 51 ICC PRAC. J. 463 (1984).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 6272 (1982); Carr, The International Energy Program and United States
Antitrust Law, 15 NAT. RESOURCES L. 503 (1983).
47. Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2158a(j) (1982).
48. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (Supp. I 1984).
49. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-156 (1982); Panel Discussion, Emerging Competitive Forces in In-
ternational Communications: Satellites and Cables, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 235 (1985).
50. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
51. High Strength Steel, Inc. v. Svenskt Stal Aktiebolag, 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,884
(N.D. II1. 1985); Victor & Bialos, The Arbitration of International Antitrust Claims: A Bold
Supreme Court Experiment in Alternative Dispute Resolution, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 183 (1986); Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in International Trade: A
Study in the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World Market, 18 J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 361 (1986); Lipner, International Antitrust Law: To Arbitrate or Not to
Arbitrate, 19 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 395 (1985).
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conduct involves "trade or commerce ... with foreign nations." Because
the antitrust laws were enacted pursuant to Congress's power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce, "commerce" has been held to include
"every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and
foreign nations." 52 Consequently, the statutes apply to import and export
transactions as well as other commercial transactions, transportation,
communication, and investment between the U.S. and a foreign country.
B. THE REQUISITE EFFECT ON U.S. COMMERCE
OF THE CHALLENGED CONDUCT
1. Import Commerce
The 1945 Alcoa decision53 of the Second Circuit announced an "ef-
fects" test of subject matter jurisdiction under the antitrust laws. Ac-
cording to Judge Learned Hand, the United States has jurisdiction over
wholly foreign conduct as well as other conduct, if that conduct has an
effect within the United States that was intended. Although no antitrust
case involving challenged conduct has occurred entirely outside the United
States since 1945, a number of different formulations of the "effects" test
have developed to describe the type of effect necessary to support juris-
diction in cases involving restraints imposed outside the flow of com-
merce. These formulas focus upon the question of whether the alleged
restraint "affects," 54 "directly affects," 55 "substantially affects," 56 "di-
rectly and substantially (or materially) affects," 57 or, has an "impact
52. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) i, 7 (1824).
53. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
54. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 445 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Flynn-Learner, 1963
Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,732, at 77,901 (D. Hawaii 1963); Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co.,
135 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100
F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd and modified, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513,525 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd and modified,
332 U.S. 319 (1947).
55. See, e.g., Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586, 587
(E.D. Pa. 1974); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-
03 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
950 (1972); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 237 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), aff'g and modifying 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
56. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976);
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 871 (1956); United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D.
Ohio 1949) ("direct and influencing"), aff'd and modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United
States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949), modified, 115 F. Supp. 835
(D.N.J. 1953); United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packet-Fahrt-Actien Gesellschaft,
200 F. 806, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), modified, 216 F. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), rev'd as moot, 239
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upon" 58 U.S. commerce. In 1977, the Antitrust Division's Antitrust Guide
For International Operations stated that the Division would require a
"substantial and foreseeable effect." 59 In practice the differences among
the various formulas have proven to be unimportant. Each signifies a legal
conclusion that the connection between the challenged conduct and U.S.
commerce is sufficient to justify a finding of subject matter jurisdiction.
For present purposes, it suffices to say that a fair reading of all the relevant
decisions supports the following jurisdictional test vis-a-vis import com-
merce: the challenged conduct must have a direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable effect on U.S. domestic commerce or on U.S.
imports. 60
2. Export Commerce
As mentioned previously, in 1982 Congress amended the Sherman and
FTC Acts to require that challenged conduct in export commerce or
wholly foreign conduct have a "direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable" effect on U.S. domestic commerce or on the trade of a person
engaged in export commerce. The legislative history of the 1982 amend-
ment indicates that Congress intended "reasonably foreseeable" to be an
objective practical standard: "The test is whether the effects would have
been evident to a reasonable person making practical business judgments,
not whether actual knowledge or intent can be shown. 6 1 The 1982 statute
codified existing case law and overruled a few aberrational decisions. 62
In all but exceptional cases, it is sufficient to state that the same require-
ment of a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect applies to
both U.S. import and export commerce. 63
U.S. 466 (1916); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Centre, Inc.,
1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
58. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705
(1962); Raubal v. Engelhard Minerals & Chems. Corp., 364 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) ("impact" on commerce).
59. INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 6.
60. See, e.g., National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1981); Conservation Council of W. Australia, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 518 F. Supp.
270 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
61. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982).
62. See, e.g., Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus. Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (entirely foreign conduct).
63. Liamuiga Tours v. Travel Impressions, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Eurim-
Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem.
Co., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,672 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Rahl, Applicability of U.S. An-
titrust Laws to Export Commerce, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 131 (1986).
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3. Consideration of Foreign Interests
In its 1976 Timberlane decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the "effects"
test of jurisdiction enunciated in Alcoa is "by itself incomplete because
it fails to consider other nations' interests. Nor does it expressly take into
account the full nature of the relationship between the actors and this
country." 64 The Ninth Circuit adopted a "jurisdictional rule of reason"
that involves evaluating and balancing numerous relevant factors. The
Third, 65 Fifth,66 and Tenth 67 Circuits have accepted the Timberlane mode
of analysis while the D.C. 68 and Seventh6 9 Circuits have questioned its
validity. The American Law Institute in its recently adopted RESTATE-
MENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
VISED) recommends the Timberlane approach. 70 The "Foreign Trade An-
titrust Improvements" bill sponsored by the Reagan Administration, passed
in October 1986 by the Senate Judiciary Committee and reintroduced in
February 1987, would codify a variation of the Timberlane approach by
requiring a court to dismiss a case brought under the federal or state
antitrust laws if it determines that:
the exercise ofjurisdiction would be unreasonable primarily on the basis
of the following factors,
(1) the relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct within
the United States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States
consumers or competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the
conduct on the United States as compared with the effects
abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered
or defeated by the action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign eco-
nomic policies. Provided, that nothing in this section shall be
construed to authorize the court to consider the effect on the
64. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1976),
aff'd after remand, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
65. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
66. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1982).
67. Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1634 (1981).
68. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
69. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
70. RESTATEMENT (REviSED), supra note 3, § 403 (tent. draft no. 7, 1986), § 415 (tent.
final draft 1985).
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foreign political relations of the United States of any action sought
to be dismissed. 7 1
While the Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on the issue, in its
recent Zenith decision, the Court noted that the plaintiff could not recover
antitrust damages based solely on an alleged cartelization of the electronic
products market in Japan because U.S. antitrust laws do not regulate
competitive conditions in other nations' economies. The Court made no
reference to the "jurisdictional rule of reason," citing instead Alcoa and
Continental Ore for the proposition that "[tihe Sherman Act does not
reach conduct outside our borders, but only when the conduct has an
effect on American commerce." 72 Thus, until Congress adopts some ver-
sion of the Reagan Administration's proposals or the Supreme Court
decides the issue, the precise status of the "jurisdictional rule of reason"
will remain unsettled. 73
VI. Personal Jurisdiction
Once the court has decided that it has subject matter jurisdiction, the
next question is whether it may lawfully assert judicial power over specific
individuals or legal entities. If there is no subject matter jurisdiction the
existence of personal jurisdiction is irrelevant. On the other hand, if there
is subject matter jurisdiction, but the defendant is not subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the court, no civil action can proceed. 74 In criminal
matters, however, it is possible to indict foreign persons who may later
enter the United States and thereby become subject to the jurisdiction of
U.S. federal courts. 75 The Justice Department has taken the position that
71. See S. REP. No. 397, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1986). For background, see 132
CONG. REC. S 2288 (1986).
72. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 n.6 (1986).
73. For recent relevant articles, see Wilkey, American Antitrust: Adjusting Conflicts with
Other Legal Systems, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1985, at 2-1 (1985); Aldisert, Federal Courts and Extraterritorial
Antitrust Law: Enlightened Self Interest or Yankee Imperialism?, 5 J.L. & COM. 415 (1985);
Fugate, Antitrust Aspects of the Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 25 VA. J.
INT'L L. 49 (1984); Griffin, Possible Resolutions of International Disputes Over Enforcement
of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 279 (1982); Lowe, The Problems of Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction: Economic Sovereignty and the Search for a Solution, 34 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 724 (1985); Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or "There and Back
Again", 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7 (1984); Meesen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary
International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783 (1984).
74. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and
Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85 (1983).
75. See, e.g., United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche, 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,434
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Arrest of Dutch Price Fixer May Bring Quinine Cartel Nolo Pleas, 690
Antit. & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) A-6 (1974) (reporting arrest of Dutch national at Kennedy
Airport six years after his indictment).
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criminal actions should be brought against individuals only if they know-
ingly violate U.S. law and that foreign individuals often are less familiar
with U.S. law. Consequently, foreign individuals have seldom been named
as defendants in criminal antitrust cases. The Antitrust Division's decision
to name only one U.S. firm as a defendant in the Uranium Cartel criminal
case was attributable to a policy decision to allow foreign firms more
leeway in cooperating with foreign governmental policies than would be
acceptable for American firms. 76
In civil cases the Supreme Court has held that the due process clause
requires that, if the defendant is not present within the territory of the
forum, it should have "minimum contacts" with the forum of such a
nature and quality that the maintenance of the suit does not offend tra-
ditional U.S. notions of "fair play and substantial justice." 77 In practice,
the "minimum contacts" test means that the court must decide whether
it is fair and reasonable to require the defendant to come to the forum to
defend itself and whether the defendant has engaged in some affirmative
act purposefully directed toward the forum state. In February 1987 the
Court held that it was "unreasonable and unfair" to require a Japanese
tire valve manufacturer to defend a suit by a Taiwanese corporation for
indemnity arising from a product liability suit in California. The Court
stated:
The procedural and substantive interests of other nations in a state court's
assertion of jurisdiction over an alien defendant will differ from case to case.
In every case, however, those interests, as well as the Federal interest in its
foreign relations policies, will be best served by a careful inquiry into the
reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case, and an
unwillingness to find the serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by
minimal interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State. "Great care
and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal juris-
diction into the international field."
In the same case the Justices were divided over whether to adopt a sug-
gestion by four Justices that:
The "substantial connection". between the defendant and the forum State
necessary for a finding a minimum contacts must come about by an action of
the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. . . . The place-
ment of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of
the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. Additional con-
76. See Hearings on the Nomination of John H. Shenefield Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980). But see United States v. Steinerfilm, Inc., 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,086 (Case No. 3320) (D. Mass. 1986) (four European individuals
indicted).
77. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see Comment, The
Minimum Contacts Standard and Alien Defendants, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 783 (1980).
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the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum
State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing reg-
ular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through
a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State. But
a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the
product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum
State. 78
VII. Discovery of Evidence
The outcome of U.S. litigation involving foreign parties often turns on
the ability to obtain discovery of documents and other information located
outside the United States. The attempts of U.S. courts and enforcement
agencies to compel production of documents located abroad have been
the source of a large number of protests by foreign governments. 79 In
1976 the Justice Department was authorized to serve civil investigative
demands, a type of civil subpoena, upon natural or legal persons in foreign
countries in the manner prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for service of process in a foreign country. 80 However, the Antitrust
Division has attempted to avoid confrontations with foreign governments
by seeking voluntary cooperation and documents located in the United
States. 8' Since 1977 the Antitrust Division has stated that it will not
78. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 104, 106 (Feb. 24, 1987);
see, e.g., ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 536; In re Uranium Antitrust Litig.,
1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,678 (N.D. I1. 1980); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp.
4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In addition to satisfying the constitutional requirements of fairness, the
court must assert its personal jurisdiction and notify the defendant of the suit by valid
service of process. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
There are special antitrust venue provisions in sections 4 and 12 of the Clayton Act. 15
U.S.C. §§ 15, 22 (1982). The doctrine of forum non conveniens has been held not to apply
to suits under the U.S. antitrust laws. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am World Airways, 568
F. Supp. 811, 817-18 (D.D.C. 1983); Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1963 (1985); Ruyak, Venue and In Personam
Jurisdiction Involving Alien Corporations, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 599 (1981).
79. See, e.g., April & Fried, Compelling Discovery and Disclosure in Transnational
Litigation:A Canadian View, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 961 (1984); Cira, The Challenge
of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247 (1982);
Note, Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination
and Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 877 (1982); Note, Foreign
Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J.
612 (1979).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(d)(2) (1982); see FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i); Associated Container Transp.
(Australia), Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1983); Australia/Eastern U.S.A.
Shipping Conference v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 807 (D.D.C. 1982).
81. Flexner, Foreign Discovery and U.S. Antitrust Policy-The Conflict Resolving Mech-
anisms, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 315, 317 (1979).
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conduct voluntary interviews on foreign soil without prior notification to
the relevant government. 82
Because discovery in civil cases is conducted among the parties without
judicial supervision, one party often mails discovery requests to the other
party. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a person or
company may be required to produce all documents in its possession,
custody, or control, wherever located, that are "reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" 8 3 such as the possible
existence of an antitrust offense adversely affecting U.S. commerce. If a
foreign party refuses to produce documents in response to such a request,
the moving party may seek an order to compel production from the U.S.
judge. The U.S. courts have held that the existence of a foreign law that
prohibits compliance with U.S. delivery orders is not a sufficient reason
to refuse to comply with a U.S. court's order. However, the existence of
such a "blocking" law should be taken into account in deciding whether
and what sanctions should be imposed for failure to produce the ordered
documents.84 The key issue at such a sanctions hearing is whether the
nonproducing party acted in "good faith." In one case relating to the
Uranium Cartel the court entered a default judgment against the defendant
whom it believed had purposely kept incriminating documents in Canada
and delayed production so that imminent Canadian legislation would pre-
vent that evidence from being produced in the U.S. litigation.85
When faced with the demand for discovery against an alien party, U.S.
courts focus on three issues. First, does the court have personal juris-
diction over the foreign party? Second, does the party have control over
the documents? Third, if foreign law prohibits disclosure or removal of
the documents, should the court order compliance with a subpoena or
exercise its discretion to review the subpoena in order to avoid ordering
a violation of the foreign law as a matter of comity?
The RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES suggests the following approach to the blocking
statute dilemma:
If disclosure of information located outside the United States is prohibited by
a law, regulation, or order of a court or other authority of the state in which
82. Address by Michael J. Egan, Associate Attorney General, before the Int'l Bar Ass'n,
in Atlanta, Ga. (Nov. 3, 1977).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
84. See, e.g., Socidtd Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); In re Uranium An-
titrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); Remington Prods., Inc. v. North American
Philips Corp., 107 F.R.D. 642 (D. Conn. 1985); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp.
1138 (N.D. Il. 1979); Note, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1320 (1983).
85. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231, appeal
dismissed, 451 U.S. 901 (1980).
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the information or prospective witness is located, or of the state of which the
prospective witness is a national,
(a) the person to whom the order is directed may be required by the court
or agency to make a good faith effort to secure permission from the foreign
authorities to make the information available;
(b) sanctions of contempt, dismissal, or default should not ordinarily be
imposed on the party that has failed to comply with the order for pro-
duction, except in cases of deliberate concealment or removal of infor-
mation or of failure to make a good faith effort in accordance with paragraph
(a);
(c) the court or agency may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact
adverse to a party that has failed to comply with the order for production,
even if that party has made a good faith effort to secure permission from
the foreign authorities to make the information available and that effort
has been unsuccessful. 86
The United States and a number of other countries are parties to the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters. 87 The Hague Convention contains a number of limita-
tions including article 23, which permits a state to declare that it will not
execute letters of request for the purpose of "obtaining pretrial discovery
of documents as known in Common Law Countries." In one case, the
House of Lords cited this limitation in denying enforcement of a letter
interrogatory presented by Westinghouse in connection with the Uranium
Cartel litigation. 88 An unresolved issue is whether the Hague Convention
is the exclusive means, or must be used before other means, of extrater-
ritorial U.S. discovery in countries that are signatories to the Convention.
Most U.S. courts have taken the position that the Hague Convention is
not the exclusive vehicle for discovery. 89 The Justice Department has
agreed and has argued in an amicus brief that:
The Convention prescribes optional procedures, preferred by most foreign
litigants, for parties to obtain discovery of documents and information located
abroad. An American court, faced with objections to traditional American dis-
covery methods on the ground that they would violate a foreign nation's law
86. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 3, § 437(2); Atwood, Blocking Statutes and
Sovereign Compulsion: Recent Developments and the Proposed Restatement, in 1985 FORD-
HAM Cop. L. INST. 329 (1986).
87. Oct. 7, 1972, United States-Netherlands, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, reprinted
in VIII MARTINDALE-HuBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 12 (1987).
88. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547, reprinted in 17
I.L.M. 38 (1978). For a case in which the English courts did permit discovery under the
Convention, see In re Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, Q.B. (Feb.
23, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 511 (1984).
89. See, e.g., In re Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.
1986); In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am
World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C. 1984); Mclnerney, Effect of the Hague Evidence
Convention on Federal and State Discovery Procedures, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
355 (1986).
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or clearly articulated policies, should give serious consideration to use of the
Convention even though it has the power to require discovery through the
traditional means. Principles of international comity should guide a court's
decision whether to use the Convention in any particular case. 90
The Supreme Court, however, has not ruled on the issue.
VIII. Enforcement Jurisdiction
U.S. courts possess broad power to order affirmative relief in antitrust
cases. In order to redress violations of U.S. law, U.S. courts have issued
orders compelling nonresident aliens to take, or refrain from taking, spec-
ified actions outside the United States. These orders have included: in-
junctions against acts abroad that would violate U.S. antitrust laws, 91
orders requiring divestiture of stock holdings in foreign corporations, 92
transfer of foreign patent and trademark rights, 93 reasonable efforts to
promote the sale and distribution of products in foreign countries, 94 and
orders instructing alien defendants to amend an agreement made in a
foreign country. 95 Such orders have not always achieved the intended
result. For example, in the ICI case, 96 the district court for the Southern
District of New York found that DuPont and ICI had joined in a conspiracy
to restrain trade in chemical products by dividing world markets.through
patent licenses. The U.S. court ordered ICI to reassign British patents
to DuPont and enjoined ICI from asserting its British patent rights against
imported goods licensed under corresponding U.S. patents. The English
licensee of the patents, BNS, obtained an injunction in the English court
restraining ICI from complying with the U.S. order and ordering specific
performance of the ICI-BNS contract. 97 Since the ICI case, U.S. courts
have been more cautious in formulating their relief orders. For example,
in the Swiss Watchmakers case98 the U.S. court, in response to a dip-
90. Brief of United States and the SEC as Amici Curiae at 6, Socidtd Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court of Iowa, No. 85-1695 (Aug. 1986).
91. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
92. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
93. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
94. Holphane Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
95. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Centre, Inc., Civil No. 90-
170, at 14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1964). This provision was not affected by later amendments
to the decree. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Centre, Inc., 1965
Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
96. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
97. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., (1953) 1 Ch. 19 (C.A.
1952); see Kahn-Freund, English Contracts and American Antitrust Law: The Nylon Patent
Case, 18 MOD. L. REv. 65 (1955).
98. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Centre, Inc., 1963 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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lomatic note from the Swiss Government, modified the final judgment to
remove provisions dealing with future trade association activities in
Switzerland.
A number of foreign countries including the United Kingdom, 99 Aus-
tralia, I° ° and Canada' 0 have enacted legislation restricting or prohibiting
enforcement of U.S. antitrust decrees or damage awards in their juris-
dictions. Moreover, in those three countries companies that have paid
treble damage awards in U.S. litigation may, in certain circumstances,
sue the successful plaintiff in the local courts for a return of all or a
portion of the damages. These so-called "clawback" provisions have been
the source of considerable controversy.l 0 2 To date, however, they have
not been invoked.
IX. Special Defenses
In addition to the statutes of limitations and other defenses generally
available in domestic litigation a number of special defenses are available
in international antitrust cases.
A. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense that protects a foreign
sovereign and its agencies and instrumentalities from suit in U.S. courts
without its permission in certain circumstances. The foreign sovereign
immunity defense arises from a specific statute and exempts a foreign
sovereign from suit by virtue of its status. In 1976 Congress enacted the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which confers the exclusive
responsibility of determining when a foreign sovereign is entitled to im-
munity in the U.S. courts, 10 3 adopts specific procedures for exercising
personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, and provides for specific
remedies relating to foreign sovereigns.104
99. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 and Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Con-
cerning the Act, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982); see Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 257
(1981); Novicoff, Blocking and Clawing Back in the Name of Public Policy: The United
Kingdom's Protection of Private Economic Interests Against Adverse Foreign Adjudica-
tions, 7 (Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 12 (1985).
100. Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984, No. 3, Austrl. Acts (1984),
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1038 (1984); Note, Extraterritoriality: Australian Limitations on
Foreign Judgments and Discovery, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 578 (1985).
101. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, ch. 49, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 794 (1985); see
Graham, The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, I 1 CAN. Bus. L.J. 410 (1986).
102. See Note, Enjoining the Application of the British Protection of Trading Interests
Act in Private American Antitrust Litigation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1981).
103. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
104. id. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441.
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Specifically, the FSIA provides that immunity does not extend to suits
arising out of "commercial activity" by foreign sovereigns and defines
"commercial activity" as "either a regular course of commercial conduct
or a particular commercial transaction or act." The character of the trans-
action is to be determined "by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose."10 5 The statute provides an exception to immunity where a suit
is based upon one of three types of "commercial activity": (1) commercial
activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state; (2) an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere; or (3) an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with the commercial activity of a foreign state
elsewhere, if that act causes a direct effect in the United States. 106 Thus,
in order for a sovereign to be amenable to suit it must have engaged in
"commercial" activity and there must be the required nexus between that
activity and the United States.
The legislative history of the FSIA states that the Act was not intended
to alter existing holdings pertaining to the jurisdictional reach of the Sher-
man Act, but was merely intended to make such decisions applicable to
foreign states engaged in commercial activity. 107 The International Guide
notes that distinguishing between "sovereign" and "commercial" activ-
ities may be difficult and "may turn in part on questions of foreign law,
custom and practice." It also notes that such distinctions may be difficult
"unless the two sovereigns distinguish the two concepts in a similar
way." 10 8
The OPEC litigation'0 9 illustrates the difficulty of applying these general
principles. OPEC involved an antitrust action by a U.S. labor union al-
leging that OPEC and its thirteen member nations violated the Sherman
Act by engaging in price-fixing activities in the crude oil market. The
district court ruled that OPEC was entitled to sovereign immunity because
establishing terms and conditions for the removal of natural resources
from a government's territory was a "governmental" as opposed to a
"commercial" activity. It cited the general rule that if the activity is one
that "normally" could be engaged in by a private party, it is "commercial"
105. Id. § 1603(d).
106. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
107. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976).
108. INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 8 n.21 & 55 n.98; see Kane, Suing Foreign
Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1982); McCormick, The Com-
mercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine,
16 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477 (1984).
109. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553,
568 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
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activity and the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. However, if the
activity is one in which only a sovereign can engage, the activity is non-
commercial."1 0 The district court's decision erroneously focused on the
purpose, rather than the nature, of the OPEC nations' activities. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed on other grounds, specifically avoiding the sov-
ereign immunity issue. 1 11
B. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine is a policy of judicial abstention from inquiry
into the validity of an act by a foreign sovereign within its own territory.
It does not exempt any party from the process of the U.S. courts. Rather,
it establishes a conclusive presumption that certain acts by a foreign
government are valid. The defense can be raised by the court itself or
any party to an action, including a private defendant in cases where the
foreign government has not been named as a defendant."l 2 Various jus-
tifications have been offered for the doctrine since it was first announced
in 1897.113 The modern formulation emphasizes the need to avoid judicial
action that might interfere with the Executive Branch's conduct of foreign
affairs and the need for international comity.il 4 Most antitrust decisions
relating to the act of state doctrine turn on a number of factors including:
(1) the effect of the decision on U.S. foreign relations; (2) the location
and nature of the foreign state's action; and (3) concern about whether
the challenged conduct is essentially a private restraint cloaked by foreign
government involvement.' 15
110. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 568. In the Outboard Marine case, a state controlled Polish
manufacturer of golf carts was sued and was held not entitled to immunity because its
activities were clearly "commercial in nature." Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F.
Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
111. 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
112. Comment, Defenses to Actions Against Foreign States Under the United States
Antitrust Laws, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 583 (1979).
113. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
114. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
115. See, e.g., Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 110 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); Hunt v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Northrop Corp. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1048 n.25 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 156
(1983); ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY
(J. Lacey ed. 1983); Gill, Antitrust and Acts of State: A Conflict of Laws Approach, in
PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 157 (Landswehr ed. 1981); Comment, The Act of State Doc-
trine: The Need for a Commercial Exception in Antitrust Litigation, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
813 (1981).
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A number of issues relating to the act of state doctrine have yet to be
resolved by U.S. courts. Among these issues is whether the "commercial
activity" exception to the foreign sovereign immunity defense is also an
exception to application of the act of state doctrine. In the Dunhill case
four members of the Supreme Court indicated in dicta that they believed
the "commercial" exception applies to the act of state doctrine. 116 On
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has taken the position that there is no
"commercial activity" exception to the doctrine." 17 Another unresolved
issue is whether the act of state doctrine prohibits a U.S. court from
inquiring into the motive for the act of a foreign sovereign, as opposed
to inquiring into the validity of that act. The Fifth Circuit 1 8 has held that
courts may inquire into the motives behind foreign governmental conduct.
The Second" t9 and Ninth 120 Circuits have disagreed. Finally, a dispute
exists as to the governmental level at which the action in question must
occur in order for the doctrine to apply. Some courts have held that low
level "ministerial" acts such as granting patents 12 1 or decisions by foreign
courts in civil cases 122 are not the kind of government action contemplated
by the act of state doctrine. Thus, the Third Circuit has suggested that
judicial abstention under the act of state doctrine is required only when
the conduct being challenged is "a result of a considered policy deter-
mination by a government to give effect to its political and public inter-
ests-matters that would have significant impact on American foreign
relations." 123
C. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COMPULSION
Private companies are not liable for violations of the antitrust laws if
their conduct was compelled by a foreign sovereign. U.S. courts, how-
ever, have required actual compulsion, as opposed to mere authorization,
approval, or encouragement by a foreign government. Although the for-
eign sovereign compulsion defense has been mentioned in several cases, 124
116. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703-05 (1976).
117. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
118. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 393 (1979).
119. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
120. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
121. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979).
122. Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th Cir. 1976).
123. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979).
124. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
704-07 (1962); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir.
1979); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Centre, Inc., 1963 Trade
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and its validity was assumed by the Third Circuit in its Zenith decision, 125
there has been only one reported decision that actually dismissed a case
on the grounds of that defense.
In Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracibo, Inc. 12 6 Inter-
american was an American corporation engaged in the business of pro-
cessing Venezuelan crude oil at its bonded refinery in New Jersey. Texaco
and another corporation, Monsanto Venezuela, held concessions from the
Venezuelan Government for the production of crude oil. They supplied
crude oil to defendant Amoco Trading Company, an American company
that had contracted to supply crude oil to Interamerican. Texaco and
Monsanto were instructed not to ship crude oil to Interamerican by the
Venezuelan Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, which regulated oil
concessionaries. When Texaco and Monsanto refused to sell to Amoco
for resale to Interamerican, Interamerican sued all three companies for
treble damages, alleging an illegal boycott. The district court granted
defendants' motions for summary judgment because the boycott was com-
pelled by the Venezuelan authorities and "such compulsion is a complete
defense to an action under the antitrust laws based on that boycott."' 127
The Antitrust Division has stated its belief that Interamerican Refining
was "wrongly decided" to the extent that it indicated that the sovereign
compulsion defense may be available with respect to conduct within U.S.
territory. 128
In an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the Zenith case the U.S.
Government contended that foreign sovereign compulsion is one of the
rare instances in which it is proper to read an implied and, therefore,
limited defense into the U.S. antitrust laws. However, the Government
suggested a number of limitations on the defense.
(1) The challenged conduct must have been compelled by a foreign
sovereign. The Government rejected the analogy to Southern Motor
Carriers,129 which recognized a state action defense for conduct
that is authorized and actively supervised by a state government.
Cas. (CCH) 70,600, at 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), judgment modified, 1965 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
125. "We may assume, without deciding, that a government-mandated export cartel
arrangement fixing minimum export prices would be outside the ambit of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act." In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 315 (3d Cir. 1983).
126. 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1296 (D. Del. 1970).
127. Id.
128. INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 51-52; see also Sabre Shipping Corp. v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (even if sovereign
compulsion were established, it "would not necessarily immunize [the defendants] ... from
prosecution or civil responsibility for acts done in United States commerce").
129. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721,
1730-31 (1985).
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(2) A statement by a foreign government to the court or to the State
Department that the conduct at issue was compelled should be
deemed "conclusive" if the statement is "clear and intelligi-
ble." 130
(3) On the other hand, "plainly ambiguous or internally inconsistent"
statements by foreign governments need not be treated as dispositive
and "in extraordinary circumstances," if the court believes that the
statement is "incredible," it may "inquire into the underlying cir-
cumstances."
(4) If the foreign government does not speak, any claimed compulsion
must be "demonstrated with clarity."
(5) Finally, the U.S. Government suggested that the defense should not
apply in antitrust suits brought by the Government, and that the
courts should defer to the Executive Branch's decision to initiate
the litigation. According to the Government, the decision to initiate
a suit "amounts to a determination by the executive branch that
the challenged conduct is more harmful to the United States than
is any potential injury to our foreign relationships that will follow
from the antitrust action." 131 The U.S. Government concluded that
the Third Circuit unjustifiably disregarded the "clear and disposi-
tive" statement by a Ministry of the Japanese Government that it
compelled the challenged agreements.
The Governments of Australia, Canada, France, and the United King-
dom sought and obtained permission to file an unprecedented joint amicus
brief on the sovereign compulsion issue. Not surprisingly their views
differed from that of the U.S. Government. They contended that the
foreign sovereign compulsion defense is a judicial acknowledgment of the
fundamental principle of international law that "a sovereign's exercise of
its authority within its territory is not reviewable by the courts of another
nation." 132 They also contended that:
(1) Express compulsion is not necessary: [T]he determinative inquiry for a U.S.
court is whether the foreign sovereign exercised its authority to mandate
the relevant conduct. The fact that a foreign sovereign may express itself
in a manner other than by explicit, compulsory orders may reflect a different
style of governance, not a less intense involvement in the issue. .. . In-
flexibility by U.S. courts in requiring explicit formal orders would discrim-
inate improperly in favor of governments with centrally planned and highly
130. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
131. Id.
132. Brief of the Governments of Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
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regulated economies and would elevate the form of the foreign sovereign's
involvement over the substance of that involvement. 133
(2) The most reliable evidence of a foreign sovereign's policy, law, method of
operation, and intentions vis-A-vis challenged conduct is a statement by that
sovereign. Consequently, the foreign governments urged the Court to hold
that "official statements made to U.S. courts by friendly foreign govern-
ments that they mandated private conduct may not be disregarded."' 134
(3) The act of state doctrine precludes U.S. courts from adjudicating the ve-
racity of an official statement by a friendly foreign government that it com-
pelled challenged private conduct and such statements should be given
"dispositive weight."
(4) Finally, the foreign governments urged the Court to decide compulsion "as
early in the proceedings as possible" in order to avoid disruption of har-
monious international economic relations135
The majority opinion in Zenith found it unnecessary to reach these
issues because it concluded that, if there was a conspiracy, evidenced by
the challenged agreements, to charge higher than competitive prices in
the U.S. market, plaintiffs could not have suffered a cognizable injury
because, as competitors of the alleged conspirators, they stood to gain
from any conspiracy to raise the market price. 136
D. RESTRAINTS APPROVED BY THE U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The foreign sovereign compulsion defense has a domestic counterpart.
Directives of an entity of the U.S. Government will immunize anticom-
petitive conduct if they originate from statutory exemptions or from ex-
ecutive authority to authorize such conduct. The Consumer's Union case
involved participation by the President and the State Department in ne-
gotiations with foreign steel producers that resulted in limitations of sales
by foreign steel producers in the United States. Consumer's Union chal-
lenged these "voluntary" steel agreements under the antitrust laws as
anticompetitive restrictions on the quantity of steel that could be imported
into the United States. The Justice Department argued that the challenged
agreements were a valid exercise of the President's powers. In dictum
the district court stated that "[t]he President clearly has no authority to
give binding assurances that a particular course of conduct, even if en-
couraged by his representatives, does not violate the Sherman Act or
133. Id. at 10.
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id. at 12.
136. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 1362. The minority opinion also stated
that its discussion was not intended to imply any conclusion on the validity of the sovereign
compulsion defense. Id. at 1366 n.5; Meal, Governmental Compulsion as a Defense Under
United States and European Community Antitrust Law, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51
(1981); Waller, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S. Antitrust Law: The
Japanese Auto Restraints and Beyond, 14 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747 (1982).
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other related congressional enactments any more than he can grant im-
munity under such laws."' 37 On appeal, the circuit court vacated the
district court's discussion of this issue because the plaintiff had agreed
to a dismissal of the antitrust allegations and the defendants were "not
surprisingly, perturbed by some of the comments made by the District
Court with respect to possible Sherman Act liability". 138 Thus, the issue
of the extent to which private firms cooperating with Executive Branch
conduct are immune from antitrust liability is unresolved.139
E. PETITIONING FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects joint activities by private par-
ties that involve petitioning or soliciting state and federal legislators, ju-
dicial bodies, executive officials, and administrative agencies to make
decisions that are anticompetitive.140 The issue of whether, and under
what circumstances, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies to efforts to
influence foreign governmental actors remains open. This question typi-
cally arises in situations where private defendants raise the defense of
foreign sovereign compulsion or the act of state doctrine and the plaintiff
counters by arguing that the relevant sovereign act was solicited or in-
duced by the private party. The Fifth Circuit has held that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine does apply to petitioning foreign governments. 14 1
Other courts have indicated willingness to apply the doctrine similarly. 142
However, other courts have indicated that they do not believe that the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies to petitioning foreign governmental
action. 143 The International Guide took the position that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine does apply abroad. 144 In later litigation, however,
137. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (D.D.C. 1973).
138. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
139. Compare Letter from Associate Attorney General John H. Shenefield to Senator
Carl Levin (Dec. 29, 1980), reprinted in [Current Comment 1969-1983] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 1 50,422 with Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to Ambassador
Yoshio Okawara of Japan (May 7, 1981), reprinted in 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,998
(foreign firms would not incur antitrust liability by complying with government directives);
Matsushita & Repeta, Restricting the Supply of Japanese Automobiles: Sovereign Com-
pulsion or Sovereign Collusion?, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 47 (1982); De Kieffer, Antitrust
and the Japanese Auto Quotas, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 59 (1982).
140. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R.
Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
141. Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983).
142. See, e.g., United States v. AMAX, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,467, at 71,799
(N.D. III. 1977).
143. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal.
1971); Bulkferts, Inc. v. Salatin, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 65,272, at 69,605 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
144. INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 63.
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the Antitrust Division argued that the doctrine does not apply "across
the board in all dealings with foreign governments."'' 45 It has been held
that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not bar discovery of whether
there was lobbying and other foreign efforts to influence foreign govern-
ments. 146
A related, unresolved issue is whether the Noerr-Pennington defense
applies to petitions to foreign courts or foreign governments designed to
elicit actions such as "blocking orders" or injunctions that would frustrate
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 147
X. Frequently Encountered Problem Areas
A. INTERNATIONAL CARTELS
A significant number of international antitrust cases have related to
agreements between U.S. and foreign entities to fix prices or to allocate
markets. Such agreements among competitors or potential competitors
suppress competition among the parties, raise prices, and reduce output
and consumer choice. They also may erect private barriers to trade, thereby
undermining diplomatic efforts to liberalize trade. In the 1940s and 1950s
the Justice Department successfully attacked a number of private inter-
national cartels. 148 In more recent times attention has shifted to more
complicated situations, often involving governmentally sponsored cartels
or cartels in which governments are actual participants. Obviously, these
cases raise a number of the special defenses previously mentioned and
present more complex problems. The OPEC and Uranium cartel cases
presented hotly contested examples of the complexities of dealing with
foreign governmental involvement in international transactions. 149
145. Australia/Eastern U.S.A. Shipping Conference v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 807,
812 (D.D.C. 1982).
146. Associated Container Transp. (Australia) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1983).
147. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am World Airways, 604 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984);
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am World Airways, 596 F. Supp. 202, 205 n.9 (D.D.C. 1984);
Note, The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and the Petitioning of Foreign Governments, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1984).
148. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Bayer
Co., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114
(S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd.,
100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753
(D.N.J. 1949); United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United
States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947);
United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
149. See, e.g., Note, The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to International Cartels
Involving Foreign Governments, 91 YALE L.J. 765 (1982); Joelson & Griffin, The Legal
Status of Nation-State Cartels Under United States Antitrust and Public International Law,
9 INT'L LAW. 617 (1975).
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B. JOINT VENTURES
A wide range of business arrangements is included within the term
"joint venture." These ventures can take a variety of legal forms from
purely contractual arrangements, such as joint bidding groups, to the
creation of jointly owned corporate subsidiaries. Some of the previously
mentioned cartel cases involved situations where joint ventures were used
improperly to allocate markets. 150 Thus, the first question in any analysis
of a joint venture is: what are the purposes of the partners in entering
into the venture? Are the purposes procompetitive and efficiency en-
hancing, for example sharing risks and capital requirements, reducing
costs, combining skills, and achieving economies of scale; or is the intent
of the parties basically anticompetitive, for example to divide markets or
restrain competition? In the latter situation the use of a joint venture
format will not prevent a finding of illegality.
If the creation of the venture is deemed lawful, the next step is to
determine whether any competitive restraints included in the venture
agreement are realistically and reasonably necessary to facilitate the for-
mation or successful operation of the venture. If the challenged restraint
does not facilitate the formation or operation of the venture it is a "naked"
restriction, which is evaluated under antitrust standards governing agree-
ments between unrelated firms. On the other hand, if the restraint is
reasonably related to a lawful business purpose, the next step is to de-
termine whether the restraint is the narrowest possible restraint capable
of achieving the lawful goals of the venture. If the restraint is reasonable,
it is lawful. 151
Antitrust Division officials have suggested a three-part analysis of joint
ventures: the effect of the joint venture on competition in the joint ven-
ture's market; the effect on competition in the parents' markets; and the
reasonableness of any ancilliary restrictive provisions. 152
One highly publicized example of antitrust analysis of an international
joint venture involved a joint production agreement between General Mo-
tors and Toyota to produce subcompact automobiles in the United States.
By a three-to-two vote, the FTC approved the joint venture after insisting
on certain modifications. The majority found that: (1) the venture was
150. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
151. See A.B.A. Antitrust Section, National Institute on Joint Ventures: Antitrust Prob-
lems and Opportunities, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 881 (1986); Garvey, Transnational Joint Ventures
and Antitrust Analysis, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 331 (1985); Griffin, Technology Transfers and
Joint Ventures Under U.S. Antitrust Laws, in 1982 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 179 (1983);
Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J. 1605 (1986).
152. See Assistant Attorney General P. McGrath, Remarks on "Joint Ventures-Depart-
ment of Justice Analysis" before the New England Antitrust Conference, reprinted in 5
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,470 (Nov. 2, 1984).
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likely to increase the number of subcompact cars available in the United
States, thus allowing U.S. consumers a greater choice at a lower price;
(2) there would be reduced production costs; and (3) "the venture offers
a valuable opportunity for GM to complete its learning of more efficient
Japanese manufacturing and management methods." 153
In another case a U.S. company entered into a joint venture with four
foreign companies to develop, produce, and sell a new, low-thrust jet
engine. The Antitrust Division issued a favorable Business Review Letter
concluding that the venture promoted competition because not more than
one of the parents would have entered this new market independently. 154
For a number of years enforcement authorities made a distinction be-
tween research and development joint ventures and joint ventures for
production or marketing of products. 155 In 1984 Congress enacted the
National Cooperative Research Act in order to promote joint research
and development ventures. Under this statute companies are encouraged
to notify the Antitrust Division and the FTC voluntarily of their research
joint venture. If the companies make such notification and the venture is
subsequently held illegal, they are liable for only single, as opposed to
treble damages. On the other hand, they are entitled to attorneys' fees if
they substantially prevail against an antitrust plaintiff. 156 As of this writ-
ing, about eighty ventures have taken advantage of this provision.
C. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Vertical restraints are arrangements between firms operating at different
levels of the manufacturing or distribution chain that restrict conditions
under which firms may purchase, sell, or resell. These arrangements may
include such things as exclusive distributorships, tying, resale price main-
tenance, and territorial or customer restrictions. Because of the require-
ment of a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S.
commerce," most restraints imposed on companies outside the United
States do not have the requisite effect on U.S. commerce to raise U.S.
antitrust concerns. On the other hand, vertical restraints imposed by a
foreign manufacturer on U.S. distributors usually will have the requisite
effect on US. commerce. Domestic rules of antitrust analysis generally
153. In re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 387-88 (1984); see Brodley, The Limited
Scope and Precedential Value of the FTC's GM-Toyota Decision, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP.
L. INST. 223 (1985); Note, International Joint Ventures in the United States: The GM-Toyota
Deal, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (1984).
154. Business Review Letter to United Technologies Corp. (Oct. 27, 1983).
155. ANTITRUST DIVISION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE CONCERNING RE-
SEARCH JOINT VENTURES (1980).
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1982); Foster, Curtner & Dell, The National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984 as a Shield from the Antitrust Laws, 5 J.L. & CoM. 347 (1985).
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apply to vertical restraints imposed by foreign companies on U.S. con-
cerns operating in U.S. domestic or foreign commerce.' 57 Special argu-
ments may be available, however. For example, a foreign supplier may
be able to argue that its vertical restraints are justified because they are
necessary to overcome barriers to entry into the U.S. market.
In 1985 the Antitrust Division published enforcement guidelines on
"Vertical Restraints" 158 which have become the subject of some contro-
versy because a number of observers believe that they do not accurately
reflect the current case law. 159
D. LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Since the early 1980s courts and enforcement authorities have taken an
increasingly favorable view of restraints imposed in connection with li-
censing and other transfers of intellectual property rights. In a series of
speeches during the late 1960s and 1970s, the Antitrust Division developed
a list of restrictive clauses in technology licenses that it asserted should
be deemed to be per se unreasonable and therefore illegal. This list became
known as the "nine no-no's.' 160 In November of 1981, however, the
Antitrust Division retracted the "nine no-no's" on the grounds that "as
statements of rational economic policy, [they] contained more error than
accuracy."' 161 The 1985 Vertical Restraints Guidelines take the position
157. See, e.g., Engine Specialities, Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979);
Lithium Corp. of Am., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,355 (1986).
158. 50 Fed. Reg. 6,263 (1985).
159. See, e.g., VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES, H.R. REP. No. 399, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1985) (the Division's Guidelines "do not accurately state current antitrust law");
Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys General, State Attorneys General Vertical Restraints Guidelines,
reprinted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,478 (Dec. 4, 1985).
160. See, e.g., Address by Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Anti-
trust Division, "Straight Talk from 'Alice in Wonderland,' " before the American Patent
Law Association, in Washington (Jan. 1, 1975). The nine "no-no's" were: (1) requirement
that licensee purchase unpatented materials from the licensor; (2) requirement that the
licensee assign to the licensor any patents issued to the licensee after execution of the
licensing agreement; (3) restriction on the resale of the patented product; (4) restriction on
licensee's "freedom to deal in the products or the services not within the scope of the
patent"; (5) agreement by the licensor not to give licenses to others without the licensee's
consent; (6) mandatory package licensing; (7) conditioning grant of a license on payment
of "royalties in an amount not reasonably related to the licensee's sales of products covered
by the patent"; (8) restrictions on sales by the licensee of a process patent of products made
under the patent; and (9) price restrictions.
161. Rule, The Antitrust Implications of International Licensing: Analyzing Patent and
Know-How Licenses, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,482 (Oct. 21, 1986); McGrath, Patent
Licensing-Antitrust Division's View, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,466 (April 5, 1986);
Lipsky, Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing Practices, 50 ANTITRUST L.J.
515 (1981); Griffin, The Demise of the "Nine No-No's" and Other Significant Changes in
U.S. Antitrust Policies Concerning Transnational Technology Licensing, 15 Swiss REv.
INT'L COMPETITION L. 39 (1982).
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that restrictions in intellectual property licenses should be condemned
only in three situations where they: (1) involve naked restraints of trade
unrelated to the development of intellectual property; (2) are used to
coordinate a cartel among owners of competing intellectual property; or
(3) suppress the creation or development of competing intellectual prop-
erties. 162 Despite the Antitrust Division's pro-patent attitude, a number
of older cases apply antitrust prohibitions more vigorously than current
enforcement policy to restraints contained in patent licenses. 163 It remains
to be seen whether the courts will adopt the Reagan Administration's
pro-patent suggestions.
E. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
U.S. antitrust enforcement officials have consistently taken the position
that they do not discriminate against, or in favor of, business entities on
the basis of their citizenship. In fact, a number of enforcement officials
have stated that they encourage foreign acquisitions of U.S. businesses.
Such acquisitions are likely to be procompetitive because new technol-
ogies and new capital will be introduced into the U.S. economy. 164
Similarly, U.S. courts have rejected contentions that they should enjoin
or prohibit acquisitions by aliens merely because the acquirers are foreign.
Courts generally have taken the position that, absent congressional guid-
ance to the contrary, foreign investment will be tested under the same
standards as domestic investment. 16 5 Because enforcement authorities
have recognized that mergers between U.S. and foreign companies involve
situations of concurrent jurisdiction, they have been particularly careful
to fashion structural relief in such a manner as to permit the merger to
go forward abroad while satisfying U.S. antitrust concerns. 166 There ap-
162. 50 Fed. Reg. 6,263, 2.4 (1985).
163. Fugate, Antitrust Aspects of International Patent and Technology Licensing, 5 J.L.
& CoM. 433 (1985); A.B.A. Antitrust Section, National Institute on Industrial and Intel-
lectual Property, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 479 (1984); A.B.A. Antitrust Section, Monograph No.
6, U.S. Antitrust Law in International Patent and Know-How Licensing (1981).
164. INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 18; see also Baxter, Enforcement of U.S.
Antitrust Laws-Present and Future-A View from the Justice Department, in SHOULD
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ALONE DICTATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES? 24 (1982); Interview with John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General,
875 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) AA-1, at AA-7 (Aug. 3, 1978).
165. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 608 (W.D. Pa. 1975);
Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canadian Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 419 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
166. See, e.g., United States v. American Brands, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,276
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (consent decree) (acquisition by U.S. stapler company of British stapler
company with a U.S. subsidiary permitted but U.S. company ordered to divest one of its
two lines); United States v. Gillette Co., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,691 (D. Mass. 1975)
(consent decree) (acquisition by U.S. company of potential German competitor permitted
on condition that new company be created with the same capacity as the German company
SPRING 1987
340 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
pear to be no reported cases in which a merger between foreign firms
transacting no business in the United States has been successfully chal-
lenged under the U.S. antitrust laws.
Since 1976 parties to certain large mergers and corporate joint ventures
have been required to notify the FTC and the Antitrust Division of their
proposed transactions and to wait for stated periods of time before con-
summating the transaction. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act's premerger no-
tification requirements apply to acquisitions with net sales or total assets
of at least $100 million and an entity with net sales or total assets of $10
million, if the acquiring person gains fifteen percent or more than $15
million worth of the voting securities or assets of the acquired firm.167
The implementing regulations exempt the following types of transactions
from premerger notification requirements: (1) acquisition by U.S. com-
panies of certain foreign assets or of voting securities of foreign entities
whose U.S. assets in sales do not meet the minimum threshold require-
ments; (2) acquisitions by foreign companies of foreign assets or of voting
securities of foreign companies not resulting in direct or indirect control
over U.S. assets or corporations meeting the minimum threshold require-
ments or when both parties to the acquisition are foreign, when the com-
bined U.S. sales and combined U.S. assets are each less than $110 million
dollars; (3) acquisition by foreign states, governments, or agencies (other
than corporations engaged in commerce), and (4) acquisitions by or from
companies "controlled" by foreign governments of assets located in, or
corporations organized under the laws of, that foreign state. 168
The enforcement authorities have had little difficulty in obtaining sat-
isfactory compliance with requests for information relating to mergers
from foreign companies. This is principally because foreign governments
have viewed the premerger notification provisions as an acceptable pre-
condition to acquiring a U.S. firm. Moreover, the enforcement authorities
have made it clear that unless they obtain sufficient information with which
to evaluate the transactions, they will refuse to permit it to be
consummated.' 69
to sell in the United States); United States v. CIBA Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,269
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consent decree) (merger of two foreign firms permitted on the condition
that certain U.S. assets be divested to eliminate anticompetitive effects in the United States).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 18A (1982); 16 C.F.R. §§ 801-03; S. AXINN, B. FOGG & N. STOLL,
ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT (1979).
168. ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 554.
169. Calvani & Tritell, Issues in International Antitrust Discovery: View From the FTC,
in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 89 (1985); Griffin, The Impact of the U.S. Justice De-
partment's 1984 Merger Guidelines on Transnational Mergers, 23 Swiss REV. INT'L COM-
PETITION L. 7 (1985); Symposium, U.S. Industrial Competitiveness and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act: Are They Compatible?, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1986). See generally B. Fox &
E. Fox, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS (1968).
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XL. Conclusion
It has long been recognized that the best answer to the problems created
by the application of the U.S. antitrust laws to transnational business
transactions would be a multilateral treaty. Despite the success of the
European Community with such a treaty, attempts to reach a broader
consensus have failed. In the foreseeable future serious conflicts will be
resolved on ad hoc political bases and international comity will be relied
on to minimize friction in routine cases.
SPRING 1987

